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Using a global dataset of over 100 developed and developing countries, we attempt to identify 
the nexus between immigration and the economic performance of countries, as proxied by 
export sophistication. To isolate causal effects, we use instruments obtained from a pseudo-
gravity model of bilateral immigration in the spirit of Frankel and Rose (2002). Employing an 
extensive set of institutional, demographic, climate and disease controls, we find that countries 
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Immigration is one of the most important and controversial phenomena currently. 
Almost 258 million persons worldwide reside in places different from their homeland 
(United Nations, 2017),1 inducing a rightward shift in the ideology of the native-born 
(see, e.g., Barone et al, 2016; Halla et., 2017; Edo et al., 2019). Although there is a 
voluminous literature on the effects of immigration on the labour market opportunities 
of natives,2 very little is known about the impact of immigration on the economic 
performance of the host countries in a broader sense (Borjas, 2019). Immigrants do 
not only contribute to the expansion of labour supply, but they also bring new skills 
and ideas, which could potentially foster creativity and promote economic growth. 
Thus, beyond the simple partial equilibrium model of the labour market, 
immigration can deliver favourable effects and make natives better off by contributing 
to the expansion of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (i.e., the “knowledge” or the 
“effectiveness of labor” term in the Solow growth framework), through its impact on 
innovation and entrepreneurship (Bansak et al., 2015). Productivity gains can also 
emerge from higher diversity among immigrants (Alesina et al., 2016). Immigrants can 
help development through the trade creation channel as well, increasing exports to 
their countries of origin (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Peri and Requena‐
Silvente, 2010). On the contrary, however, negative effects on the diffusion of 
“knowledge” and economic growth can emerge when the presence of migrants erodes 
social trust and triggers ethnic conflicts (Felbermayr et al., 2010; Ager and Brückner, 
2013).3 What is more, unskilled migration can be to the detriment of the receiving 
economies if it reduces machinery investments undertaken by local firms (Lewis, 
2011).  
The results of the few cross-country studies suggest that there is a positive 
association between immigration and TFP in the receiving countries (see e.g., Ortega 
and Peri, 2014; Aleksynska and Tritah, 2015). Likewise, Bosetti et al. (2015) reveal 
that high-skilled immigration has contributed to the creation of “knowledge” (proxied 
by patents per capita) in a panel of 20 European countries. On the other hand, studies 
                                                          
1 The UN report is available at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/popfacts-
/PopFacts_-2017-5.pdf 
2 See, among many others, Borjas (2003); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); Manacorda et al. (2012); Biavaschi et al. 
(2018). 
3 There is also some evidence that immigration affects economic development through its impact on institutions 
and political stability (see e.g., Dimant et al., 2013; Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan, 2013; Clark et al., 2015). 
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on the direct effects of immigration or ethnic diversity on economic development tend 
to produce mixed results (see e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Ager and 
Brückner, 2013; Boubtane et al., 2013a; Boubtane et al., 2013b; Ortega and Peri, 
2014; Alesina et al., 2016; Boubtane et al., 2016).4  
This study seeks to examine the relationship between immigration and the 
economic performance of countries, building on a recent promising strand of the 
literature, which suggests that the sophistication of a country’s exports is a powerful 
predictor for economic growth and development (see e.g., Hausmann et al., 2007; 
Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). In particular, using data for a 
global sample of developed and developing countries, we estimate the relationship 
between the share of foreign-born individuals over total population and the Economic 
Complexity Index (ECI), intended to capture the knowledge intensity of an economy, 
as embedded in its exports. We aim to contribute to the literature which examines the 
potential effects of immigrants on the diffusion of “knowledge” and innovation, 
employing the ECI as a proxy. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
assess whether immigration generates spillovers on the amount of “knowledge”, 
through its impact on export sophistication.5 
This paper also contributes to the emerging literature which explores the 
potential drivers of export sophistication (see, e.g., Lapatinas and Litina, 2018; Fan et 
al., 2018; Kočenda and Poghosyan, 2018 Lapatinas, 2019). The study more closely 
related to ours is Fan et al. (2008), who examine the impact of ethnic fractionalization 
on ECI, based on a sample of 85 countries. Nevertheless, since these authors rely on 
random and fixed effects methods, their results might suffer from the potential 
endogenous distribution of foreigners across countries. On the contrary, our paper 
attempts to identify the effects of general migration, putting special care on 
endogeneity related issues.  
Our study is also related to the literature examining the determinants of 
international migration by fitting a pseudo gravity model of bilateral migrations (see, 
e.g., Mayda, 2010; Grogger and Hanson, 2011). We pursue a similar approach to 
mitigate concerns to the validity of our analysis, stemming from the fact that the 
selection of migrants might be endogenous to the economic conditions prevailing in 
                                                          
4 As for single-country analyses, see, among others, Ottaviano and Peri (2006); Peri (2012); Hunt and Gauthier-
Loiselle (2012). 
5 A partial exception is Valette (2019) who examines the impact of emigrants from developing countries on the 
economic sophistication of their origin countries. 
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the receiving countries. This identification strategy has recently gained wide 
acceptance among researchers attempting to isolate causal effects of migration (see, 
e.g., Felbermayr et al., 2010; Mavisakalyan, 2011; Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan, 
2013; Ortega and Peri, 2014; Aleksynska and Tritah, 2015; Kahanec and Pytliková, 
2017). Overall, our analysis produces robust evidence that immigration is negatively 
associated with the capacity of the countries under scrutiny to export complex 
products. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
2. Data and Empirical Model 
To assess the impact of immigration on export sophistication, we combine data from 
various sources for up to 111 countries in the year 2000. Our dependent variable is 
the improved version of the standard Economic Complexity Index (ECI), which reflects 
the diversity and the ubiquity of a country’s exports (that is, the number of products 
exported by a country, and the number of countries exporting that product, 
respectively), corrected by how difficult it is to export each product (available at: 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/).6 As shown in Figure 1, advanced economies in 
Northern Europe and America tend to exhibit higher levels of economic complexity. 
Interestingly, as discussed in Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), this index is a strong 
predictor of future economic growth. Information on our main independent variable of 
interest, namely immigration, is drawn from the World Development Indicators 
(available at: datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/). Following 
previous literature, the immigration variable is defined as the ratio of the migrant stock 
over total population.7 
With these definitions in mind, immigration is expected to be positively 
associated with the economic complexity index, insofar as migrants add to the stock 
of productive “knowledge” and foster innovation. Immigrants can also improve 
economic complexity through the trade creation channel. The alternative view is that 
                                                          
6 For further details on the construction of ECI, we refer the reader to Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009); Albeaik et al. 
(2017). 
7 The upper part of Figure 1 depicts the allocation of migrants across countries in the year 2000, whereas the lower 
part shows the values of the Economic Complexity Index for that same year. 
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mainly unskilled migration reduces the capacity of a country to produce and export 
differentiated goods. 
To avoid obtaining spurious results due to omitted variables bias, we also employ 
an extensive set of control variables, which are likely to explain cross-country 
differences in economic sophistication, as in Lapatinas and Litina (2018); Fan et al. 
(2018); Lapatinas (2019). In particular, we introduce covariates that capture the level 
of economic of economic development (GDP per capita), the quality of institutions 
(polity index), the degree of trade openness (sum of imports and exports over GDP), 
the stock of human capital (share of college graduates), demographics (urban share 
and population density) and infrastructure (access to broadband internet).8  In a 
battery of sensitivity tests, we introduce further climate and disease controls and 
alternative measures for institutions and openness. 
In line with existing literature, we estimate the following empirical model: 
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑀𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛/𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖         (1) 
where the index i stands for the destination country i. We also introduce 4 broad 
Region dummies9 to capture unobserved differences across regions. Following Ortega 
and Peri (2014), eq.(1) includes colonial history controls as well, that is, dummies for 
former English and French colony.   
However, the OLS estimate of 𝛽𝑀 in eq.(1) would be spurious insofar as there 
are unobserved determinants of sophistication and immigration, and which we cannot 
control for. We cannot also exclude the possibility of a feedback effect from economic 
complexity to immigration, that is, reverse causation. It might also be the case of noisy 
immigration data, mainly due to undocumented migration. As already noted above, to 
mitigate these endogeneity concerns, we employ gravity predictors of immigration as 
instruments, generated by an approach quite similar to the one introduced by Frankel 
and Rose (2002), and later adopted by Mavisakalyan (2011) and Gebremedhin and 
Mavisakalyan (2013) within the immigration context. The underlying identification 
assumption is that the gravity-based migrations represent the supply-driven 
component of immigration. 
                                                          
8 See Table 1 for a detailed description of data and sources. 
9 Namely, North and South America, Asia, Europe, Oceania. 
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More precisely, we modify the conventional gravity model by substituting (the log 
of) bilateral migrant stocks for trade as the dependent variable. We introduce in the 
set of regressors the log of GDP per capita and population in the sending countries, 
the log of distance between the sending and the destination countries, the log of the 
product of areas of countries (as a proxy for transportation costs), and 0-1 dummy 
variables for common language and border. Our gravity model is estimated with OLS 
and Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood methods, using data from Rose (2005), 
merged with the 226x226 matrix of international bilateral migrant stocks in the year 
2000, from the Global Bilateral Migration Database, (available at: https://datacatalog.-
worldbank.org/dataset-/global-bilateral-migration-database).10  
Lastly, to impute the predicted stock of immigrants, we collapse the exponent of 
the fitted values at the destination country level. Hence, our instrument is given by: 
𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = ̂ (∑ exp (ln (𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑖≠𝑗 𝛽)̂)/(∑ exp (ln (𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑖≠𝑗 𝛽)̂) +  𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖 (2) 
where indices i and j designate the destination and origin country, respectively, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is 
the matrix of the right-hand side variables included in the gravity model, ?̂? is the vector 
of the gravity coefficients, and 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖 is the observed stock of natives. 
3. Results 
In this section, we explore the effects of the immigrant share variable on the 
amount of productive “knowledge”, as proxied by the ECI, by estimating the empirical 
model described in Section 2. What is more, to assess the robustness of the results, 
we conduct a battery of robustness checks, including (i) alternative estimation 
techniques, (ii) additional controls, (iii) alternative measures for the level of institutional 
development and openness and (iv) outliers.  
However, before commenting on the impact of migration, it is important to briefly 
discuss the results obtained from the pseudo-gravity model, and which are used to 
construct our instrument. As a check of robustness, we estimate the basic model, 
discussed in section 2 (clustering standard errors at the country pair level), in column 
1 of Table 2, and two alternative variants of it in the remaining columns. In particular, 
the second specification introduces host-country dummies, whereas the third column 
                                                          
10 See Özden et al. (2011) for further details on the dataset. 
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replicates the basic model by using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood method 
instead of the OLS. Importantly, the results are quite consistent across specifications. 
More precisely, the origin country size, as proxied by GDP per capita and population, 
as well as common language and border are positively associated with the stock of 
migrants. On the contrary, the bilateral distance enters with a significant negative 
coefficient. Only the sign pattern of the coefficient on the product of land areas appears 
to alter in specification 2. In light of these findings, we chose to build our 2SLS strategy, 
relying on the results from specification 1, as in Mavisakalyan (2011) and 
Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan (2013). We note, however, that the second-stage 
results (not reported for brevity, available upon request) using the gravity-based 
instruments from specifications 2 and 3 remain qualitatively similar to the ones shown 
below in Tables 3-6. 
Table 3 offers simple OLS correlations, adding gradually furthers controls to 
verify that the results are immune to potential collinearity. Specification 1 controls for 
the level of economic development only, and migration appears to be significantly 
correlated with lower economic complexity. Adding trade openness in specification 2, 
reduces the sample size by 4 observations, but produces stronger results regarding 
the correlation between economic complexity and migration. The picture remains 
unchanged in specification 3 where we control for the level of institutional 
development, as proxied by the polity index. Column 4 introduces the share of 
population with at least a college degree. However, even after this modification, the 
effect of immigration still appears negative and significant. Our main estimates of 
interest remain similar in qualitative terms when adding demographic controls in 
specifications 5 and 6. Lastly, migration enters with a significant negative coefficient, 
even after controlling for infrastructure, as proxied by the share of individuals with 
access to broadband internet over total population. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Nevertheless, as discussed in section 3, migrants tend to cluster non-randomly 
across countries, and thus the estimates displayed above might not be interpreted as 
causal. We, therefore, recur to a 2SLS identification strategy to isolate causal effects, 
employing the gravity based, predicted migration as an instrument. The estimates from 
this empirical exercise and the associated (heteroscedasticity robust) standard errors 
are reported in Table 4. According to the first-stage results, the gravity-based 
instrument appears to be strongly correlated with immigration (not shown for brevity, 
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available upon request), whereas the Kleibergen–Paap statistics usually lie above the 
rule of thumb of 10. We interpret these findings as indicative that the estimated 
parameters of interest are unlikely to suffer from weak identification issues. Notably, 
the estimated coefficients of interest are stable across specifications, and appear to 
be nearly three times as high as the OLS correlations, signifying the presence of 
endogeneity. For instance, the coefficient on immigrant share variable in the first 
column suggests that a one percent increase in the foreign population over total 
population reduces economic complexity by about 0.67 standard deviations. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 checks the stability of our prior results to the inclusion of further controls. 
The first column adds a set of economic variables, namely a dummy for being a major 
oil exporter, government spending as a percentage of GDP, gross capital formation, 
inflation, the value added of agriculture relative to GDP, and the size of the shadow 
economy. Column 2 introduces the index of ethnic fractionalization, computed with 
data from the Global Bilateral Migration Database. The final specification, follows 
Ortega and Peri (2014), and adds region, climate and disease controls, namely, a 
land-locked dummy, the percentage of land in the tropics, and two indices for the 
incidence of malaria and yellow fever. Importantly, most of the additional controls enter 
with an insignificant coefficient, without affecting the sign pattern and the significance 
on the main independent variable of interest. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 6 reports estimates from a battery of sensitivity tests, related to the use of 
alternative measures for the quality of institutions and openness in the destination 
countries, as in Lapatinas and Litina (2018). Column 2 substitutes an institutional 
quality index for the polity index. More precisely, we follow Ortega and Peri (2014), 
and compute the average between protection against expropriation risk and 
constraints on the executive, using data from Acemoglou et al. (2001). In columns 2 
and 3 we employ the rule of law from World Bank Government Indicators and the 
democracy index from Cheibub et al. (2010), respectively. As can easily be verified, 
none of these modifications alters our main conclusion that immigration is negatively 
associated with export sophistication. In the remaining specifications, inspired by 
Dreher and Gaston (2008), we measure openness with the KOF globalization index 
and three globalization sub-indices, respectively. However, the coefficient of the 
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immigrant share remains negative and significant. Interestingly, the estimates in the 
last column, reveal that the positive effects of globalization operate through the social 
globalization channel.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
To further scrutinize the robustness of the results, we have replicated the 
analysis reported in Table 4, by using the economic complexity index in 2014 as the 
dependent variable, in order to further eliminate contemporaneous correlation 
between the main variables of interest. We have also explored whether the effects of 
migrants vary according to the host country’s stage of economic and institutional 
development.11 The results from these empirical exercises (not reported for brevity, 
available upon request), indicate that immigration continues to exhibit a strong 
negative association with export sophistication, whereas the effects do not 
systematically differ between developed and developing countries. Lastly, we run an 
experiment à la Coates et al. (2010), to assess the sensitivity of our results to individual 
outliers. More precisely, we sequentially estimate our basic IV model 1000 times, by 
randomly eliminating 10 percent of observations at a time from the sample. The 
resulting estimated coefficients on immigration and the associated t-statistics are 
reported in Figure 2. As we observe, immigration always enter with a negative 
coefficient. More importantly, we can reject the null hypothesis that immigration 
exhibits an insignificant effect in all instances, at the 10 percent level. We therefore 
can safely exclude the possibility of positive effects of immigration. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
4. Conclusions 
The main goal of the current study was to determine the impact of migrants on the 
economic performance of countries, as proxied by sophistication embedded in their 
exports. Using a cross sectional design, and pseudo-gravity estimates of bilateral 
migrations to address potential endogeneity and mitigate the usual measurement error 
concerns, we have shown that higher immigration is strongly correlated with lower 
levels of export sophistication. Hence, this study has been unable to demonstrate that 
                                                          
11 In line with literature, specification 4 employs the interaction of immigration with a high- and low- development 
dummy variables, where high (low) signifies countries with GDP per capita and Polity indices above (below) the 
median in the sample. Likewise, interactions are also applied for the gravity generated instruments. 
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migrants contribute positively to the amount of productive “knowledge” in the receiving 
countries. In light of the results from earlier studies on the determinants of growth, our 
findings also imply that immigration exerts a negative influence on economic 
development through the export sophistication channel.  
The current findings add to a growing body of literature on the nexus among 
immigration, innovation and development. Notwithstanding, this is the first study 
focusing on this particular dimension of innovation. Further research needs to examine 
more closely the links between immigration and economic complexity. Country-
specific evidence might also enhance our understanding, since some countries tend 
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Figure 1. Immigration as a percentage of a country’s population and Economic Complexity Index. 
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Table 1 Data and Sources 
 mean sd min max Source 
ECI+ 0.00 1.00 -2.51 1.65 Observatory of Economic Complexity 
Immigrant share 10.78 15.53 0.04 80.22 World Bank Development Indicators 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.75 0.19 0.05 0.97 Own Calculations 
GDPpc 8.36 1.56 5.28 11.84 World Bank Development Indicators 
Density 385.79 1907.33 0.14 21398.95 World Bank Development Indicators 
Openness 84.29 49.17 1.17 366.07 World Bank Development Indicators 
Urban 55.49 24.61 8.25 100.00 Development Indicators 
Polity 2.91 6.57 -10.00 10.00 Polity2 index. PolityIV 
Rule of law -0.02 1.00 -2.28 1.98 World Bank Government Indicators 
Economic globalization 56.38 19.36 19.43 98.23 KOF Index of Globalization 
Social globalization 46.89 21.94 5.17 92.48 KOF Index of Globalization 
Political globalization 51.84 25.86 1.00 97.02 KOF Index of Globalization 
Overall globalization 50.74 18.24 20.75 91.91 KOF Index of Globalization 
Internet 8.76 13.31 0.00 52.00 World Bank Development Indicators 
Education (HC) 6.11 5.22 0.06 22.97 Barro and Lee (2013) 
Shadow 33.80 13.07 8.60 67.30 Schneider et al. (2010)  
Oil 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.32 Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Government spending 5.06 4.97 25.86 5.06 World Bank Development Indicators 
Agriculture 8.80 0.09 35.27 8.80 World Bank Development Indicators 
Investment 5.25 10.67 36.49 5.25 World Bank Development Indicators 
Iinflation (GDP deflator) 10.50 -7.71 49.34 10.50 World Bank Development Indicators 
Institutional quality index 2.09 3.00 10.00 2.09 Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Pct. of tropic land 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.46 BACI dataset 
Democracy 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.47 Cheibub et al. (2010), 
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Table 2 Gravity Estimates of the Determinants of Bilateral Migration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Log of Bilateral migrant stock OLS FE Poisson 
    
Log gdppc at origin 0.331*** 0.442*** 0.194*** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.056) 
Log distance -1.244*** -1.526*** -0.879*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.167) 
Log population at origin 0.247*** 0.663*** 0.267*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.070) 
Common language 1.069*** 1.213*** 0.396* 
 (0.063) (0.052) (0.239) 
Common border 2.229*** 1.927*** 1.471*** 
 (0.157) (0.167) (0.428) 
Log product of land areas 0.242*** -0.001 0.396*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.057) 
    
Observations 13,914 13,914 20,608 
R-squared 0.285 0.616 0.616 
Destination Dummies No Yes No 




Table 3 The impact of immigration on economic complexity, OLS correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES eciplus eciplus eciplus eciplus eciplus eciplus eciplus 
        
Immigrant share -0.020*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDPpc 0.371*** 0.376*** 0.365*** 0.376*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.278*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.061) (0.078) (0.079) (0.096) 
Openness  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Polity index   0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 
   (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
HC    0.013 0.012 0.012 0.005 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Urban share     0.001 -0.000 0.002 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Density      0.000 0.000 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet       0.010 
       (0.007) 
        
Observations 111 107 106 95 95 95 94 
R-squared 0.750 0.756 0.760 0.745 0.745 0.750 0.757 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Colonial history controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 The impact of immigration on economic complexity, 2SLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Immigrant share -0.067** -0.077** -0.075** -0.074*** -0.080*** -0.076** -0.075*** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
GDPpc 0.606*** 0.581*** 0.573*** 0.563*** 0.426*** 0.423*** 0.352*** 
 (0.140) (0.134) (0.131) (0.127) (0.112) (0.110) (0.128) 
Openness  0.004* 0.002 0.003* 0.002* 0.002 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Polity index   -0.030 -0.051 -0.049 -0.046 -0.051 
   (0.027) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
HC    0.014 0.004 0.004 0.001 
    (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Urban share     0.014 0.013 0.014 
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Density      0.000 0.000 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet       0.007 
       (0.008) 
        
Observations 111 107 106 95 95 95 94 
R-squared 0.559 0.598 0.641 0.647 0.672 0.691 0.696 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Colonial history controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 10.34 7.602 10.28 13.70 15.94 13.20 13.35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 The impact of immigration on economic complexity, Further controls 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Immigrant share -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.075*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
GDPpc 0.101 0.123 0.111 
 (0.132) (0.126) (0.121) 
Openness 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Polity index -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.061** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
HC 0.011 0.016 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
Urban share 0.006 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Density 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Internet 0.009 0.008 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Oil -0.469* -0.497* -0.410 
 (0.271) (0.270) (0.288) 
Investment -0.031* -0.036** -0.035** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) 
Government 0.017 0.020 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) 
Agriculture -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.047*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Inflation -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Shadow -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.014 0.171 
  (0.326) (0.356) 
    
Observations 89 89 88 
R-squared 0.741 0.739 0.758 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Colonial history controls Yes Yes Yes 
Climate/disease controls No No Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 16.10 14.84 11.33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 The impact of immigration on economic complexity, Alternative measures of institutions 
and openness  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Immigrant share -0.082** -0.072** -0.073** -0.052** -0.064* 
 (0.035) (0.028) (0.029) (0.023) (0.038) 
      
Institutional quality 0.089     
 (0.103)     
Rule of law  -0.018    
  (0.158)    
Democracy   -0.287   
   (0.294)   
KOF globalization    0.038***  
    (0.009)  
KOF economic globalization     0.002 
     (0.006) 
KOF social globalization     0.046** 
     (0.022) 
KOF political globalization     -0.003 
     (0.013) 
      
Observations 85 95 94 97 96 
R-squared 0.629 0.647 0.647 0.715 0.701 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Colonial history controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 7.945 10.62 10.42 12.79 7.214 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Figure 2 The figure plots the frequencies of the estimated coefficients on the immigrant share 
variable, and the t-statistics, resulting from a sequential procedure of 1000 regressions, by 
randomly eliminating 10 percent of observations at a time from the sample. 
 
